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Abstract
This thesis addresses the question of how to efficiently allocate resources among com-
peting players in convex enviroments. We will analyze the efficiency loss of certain
two-sided market mechanisms involving both consumers and suppliers that are natu-
ral extensions of Johari's thesis [5]. After gaining intuition about the mechanisms, we
show that their worst case efficiency loss approaches 100%. We then introduce some
supply-side market mechanisms in a network setting. In the market mechanisms we
study, every player submits a bid which specifies a demand or supply function from a
parameterized family. Then, the mechanism allocates resources so that supply meets
demand.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Objective
This thesis addresses the question of how to efficiently allocate resources among com-
peting players in convex enviroments. We will analyze the efficiency loss of certain
two-sided market mechanisms involving both consumers and suppliers. We will then
introduce some supply-side market mechanisms in a network setting. In the market
mechanisms to be studied, every player submits a bid which specifies a demand or sup-
ply function from a parameterized family. Then, the mechanism allocates resources
so that supply meets demand.
1.2 Problem Motivation
The problem of how to effectively allocate resources in a competitive enviroment
comes up frequently in all types of engineering and economic scenarios.
Consider the real life scenario where a pizza is to be split between two equally
hungry people. How should the pizza be cut so that each person gets a fair share'? We
could have one person cut the pizza, and the other person get first pick of their half.
Since the person picking the pizza slice will take the biggest slice, this ensures the
person slicing the pizza will cut it fairly evenly. However, what if the two people are
not equally hungry; what sort of mechanism can be used to ensure efficient allocation?
We can imagine a, mechanism where one player would pay the other player for the
difference in pizza, wanted. How do we ensure such a mechanism is fair?
Using a mechanism which efficiently allocates resources is important for other
markets too. Two types of markets we are concerned with in this thesis are two-sided
markets and supply-side markets in a. network setting. As a supply side market, we
could consider a consumer based electricity market where many suppliers (generators)
compete to meet inelastic demand. Consumers do not have a way to react to prices
in real time, so we model demand as fixed (inelastic) in this case. As a two-sided
market we could have an industrial electricity market where suppliers (generators)
and consumers (industrial plants) compete to buy and sell power. Industrial plants
can conceivably change their production based on the price of power and that is why in
this setup demand is modeled by consumers in a game. History and experience tell us
that a poorly designed electricity market can skyrocket the price for power, producing
socially undesirable outcomes. Knowing how particular market mechanisms perform
in these types of scenarios can help market designers ensure efficient allocations.
1.3 Problem Statement
In this thesis we will analyze particular two-sided market mechanisms and introduce
some supply-side network market mechanisms that are direct extensions of the mech-
anisms found in Johari's thesis [5]. In the market mechanisms we consider, each
player submits a bid which parameterizes a family of supply or demand functions
and then the mechanism distributes resources so that supply meets demand. We will
consider worst case scenarios for the two-sided market mechanism and attempt to put
an upper bound on its efficiency loss. We also assume a convex enviroment for our
analysis. That is, we assume concave utilities, convex costs and convex constraints.
1.4 Previous Work
There has been a. lot of activity in recent years in the analysis of worst case efficiency
loss. Initially, economists who were studying market mechanisms were only inter-
ested in whether a Nash equilibrium results in an optimal allocation. Then in 2000,
Roughgarden and Tardos considered the ratio of the optimal flow rate in a congestion
network to the Nash flow rate. They called this quantity the 'price of anarchy' and
showed that in a linear congestion network, this quantity is no more that 1 [7]. A4
case which gives a 1 price of anarchy is given by the well-known Braess's Paradox
[7]. It should be noted that all results related to price of anarchy or efficiency loss
(including this thesis) assume a convex enviroment.
The demand-side market mechanism we consider in this thesis is the same one
Kelly presented in his work in 1997 [6]. He presented a mechanism where each con-
sumer submitted a one-dimensional bid, which specified a demand function from a
parameterized family. Then, each user received an allocation proportional to the ratio
of their own bid to the sum of all players' bids. He showed that if consumers acted
as price takers, the resulting allocation is socially optimal [6]. Hajek then showed by
using modified cost functions that when players act as price anticipators this game
has a unique Nash equilibrium [1].
Johari and Tsitsiklis took the analysis a step further and found that worst case
efficiency in this one-sided game is ý [3]. They also showed that this result holds when
the game is extended to the network setting. Later, they showed for a particular
supply-side market mechanism with N suppliers (where suppliers' bids parameterize
a family of supply curves), the worst case efficiency is [4]. There have been
N-2
similar results on closely related market mechanisms by Hajek, Yang and others [2, 8].
1.5 Contributions
In this thesis, we show that a. natural extension of Johari's one-sided mechanisms
to a two-sided mechanism yields a. worst case efficiency loss that approaches 100%.
Further, we show that other natural two-sided mechanisms where users submit sup-
ply functions parameterized by multi(timensional bids a.nd where bidding occurs in
two-stages have efficiency loss that approaches 100%7 as well. In addition, we also
define supply-side mechanisms that are extensions of Johari's and Kelly's supply side
mechanisms to the network setting.
1.6 Organization Of Thesis
This thesis is divided into four additional chapters. Chapter 2 will be a brief introduc-
tion to basic game theory and other definitions useful in the analysis of efficiency loss.
Chapter 3 will deal with some two-sided market mechanisms. A mechanism which
naturally follows from Johari's work will be precisely defined and we will show the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. We will then review numerical simulations and con-
struct worst case scenarios to gain intuition for the mechanism. Using our intuition,
we create a scenario where efficiency loss can come arbitrarily close to zero. Using
the same setup, we show for other natural two-sided mechanisms, the efficiency loss
approaches zero as well. Chapter 4 considers several supply-side market mechanisms
in a network setting. We will introduce mechanisms where each supplier submits
a multidimensional bid to the market mechanism (a bid for each consumer) as well
as a mechanism where each supplier submits a one dimensional bid. Chapter 5 will
summarize results and suggest areas of future research.
Chapter 2
Background Material
In this chapter we will present material which lays the groundwork for our analysis in
the rest of the thesis. We will review elementary game theory and define some useful
terminology.
2.1 Game Theory Basics
In the models we consider, each player in a competitive setting will simultaneously
place a set of bids. Each player knows the other players' payoff functions, but does
not know which action they will choose. The competitive setting in our thesis can
be modeled as a strategic game. A strategic game is a triplet < I, (Wi)iI, (Pi)iEI >
where
* I is a finite set of players I = (1,..., I).
* (Wi)i,(: is a, set of avaliable actions for player i. We denote wi E Wi as an action
for player i and w'_i as a vector of actions for all players except i. We also denote
1W = [H WV as the set of all profiles of actions and also call (wi , T_i) E W (or
equivalently G' E W) an outcome of the game.
* (P4)i•E is a, set of payoff functions where Pi : W -- R is a function from the set
of all outcomes to the real numbers.
This model of our market allows us to analyze wha.t happens when players are rational.
A rationa.l player i will chose her bid. wi.. to maximize her payoff given _-i. If no one
rational player would have decided to play differently given an outcome of a game, wg,
then we call that outcome a. Nash equilibrium of that game. 1\lore precisely, a. pure
strategy Nash equilibrium is an outcome Ltnash such that V i E I we have
Pi(Wi,nash, W-i,nash) i P:(wi, Z-i,nash) V Wi E Wi
A Nash equilibrium is a stable outcome that no player wants to deviate from. We are
interested in comparing a Nash equilibrium to the best possible outcome, called the
socially optimal outcome. The socially optimal outcome of a game is the outcome
which maximizes the net payoff. That is, ,,oc is a socially optimal outcome if
P(zo) > ) PŽP(0iV) vzEW w
iEI iEI
In this thesis we deal with trying to allocate resources in a competitive setting. To
do that, a market mechanism is necessary to allocate resources following a certain set
of rules. Specifically, a market mechanism takes the set of all bids, ~5, and dictates
how much each player must supply or buy and at what price.
Market D. for all i
- Mechanism
S. for all i
Figure 2-1: Market Mechanism Concept
2.2 Consumers, Suppliers, and Efficiency Loss
In this thesis, we deal with two types of players, consumers and suppliers. A consumer
is characterized by her demand curve (the amount she wants at a given price). It is
assumed that the higher the price, the lower the demand. A supplier is characterized
by her supply curve (the amount she supplies at a given price). It is assumed that the
higher the price, the greater the amount the supplier will supply. In the mechanisms
we analyze, each supplier and consumer submit a bid to the market mechanism which
parameterizes its supply and demand curves. Effectively, this bid selects a supply or
demand curve from a parameterized family of curves thereby restricting the player
from being able to submit arbitrary supply and demand curves. A sample family of
supply and demand curves is given in figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2: Example of Parameterized Curves. Supply on the left is given by S = 1-E
and demand on the right is given by D =
In our market, each supplier and consumer acts individually. We assume each
player is rational and wishes to maximize her payoff. A price taker is a player who
does not anticipate the effects of her bid on the price. She simply uses the bid which
maximizes her payoff taking the price as a constant. On the other hand, a price
anticipator foresees the effect her bid will have on the price and maximizes her payoff
accordingly. In the two-sided mechanism we will study, it turns out that if players
are price takers, the outcome is socially optimal.
Efficiency loss is the focus of this thesis. In crude terms, efficiency loss is a. measure
0 0,
of the payoff lost when players act selfishly. Specifically, efficiency loss is one minus
the ratio of the aggregate payoff in the worst ca.se Nash equilibrium to the aggregate
payoff in the socially optimal outcome. That is,
minnash Ei Pi(Wnash)Efficiency loss = 1 -
We will study this efficiency loss in the context of two-sided markets and attempt to
put upper bounds on it. These upper bounds will allow us to put some guarantees
on the results of selfish behavior in the system with respect to the socially optimal
solution.
Chapter 3
A Two-Sided Market
3.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the question of how to efficiently distribute resources amongst
competitive players in a two-sided market. Such efficiency concerns can aid in the
design of particular engineering systems such as power networks because every utility
and generator acts only in their own self interest.
Much analysis has already been done by Johari on one-sided market mechanisms.
In his thesis, he considers two market mechanisms: a supply-side market mechanism
and a demand-side market mechanism, and puts certain bounds on the efficiency loss
of these market mechanisms. In this chapter, we will consider a two-sided market
mechanism which is a logical combination of the two one-sided market mechanisms
found in Johari's thesis [1].
After defining and discussing the market mechanism, we prove that this mech-
anism is guaranteed to have a Nash equilibrium as long as there are at least two
suppliers and one consumer in the market, under some reasonable assumptions on
the cost and utility functions. Second, we identify utility and cost functions which
maximize efficiency loss within a certain family of utility and cost functions. This
allows us to get a better intuition about worst case scenarios for this market mecha-
nism. Then, we will go through specific numerica.l examples to gain insight about the
mechanism. Our intuition will help us to construct an example where the efficiency
loss goes to one and discuss the example's characteristics. Last, we will analyze other
two-sided mechanisms and reveal they also have a worst case efficiency loss which
approaches one.
3.2 Assumptions On Players and Market Setup
In this section we define and discuss the two types of players, the market mechanism,
supply and demand bidding functions, assumptions on the utility and cost functions
and the payoff functions. The market consists of two types of players, consumers
and suppliers. There are a total of Q consumers and R suppliers. Every consumer
and supplier submits a nonnegative bid to the mechanism. The it h consumer's bid is
represented by we, , and the i th supplier's bid is represented by w'. Define the vector
of all players bids to be w'. Similarly, define the vector of all players bids excepts for
the ith consumer's bid to be 'jC. Also define the vector of all players bids except the
ith supplier's bid to be Wj'S. These bids parameterize demand and supply functions,
Di(p, wc ) and Si(L, w') which are given by:
Di(p,, wc) = w
Si(p·, wi') =- 1 
i
These demand and supply functions are similar to the ones in the one-sided market
mechanisms Johari used in his thesis. We assume that the ith consumer's utility and
the i t h supplier's cost can be quantified and are given by Ui(D) and Ci(S) on the range
D > 0 and S < 1. We further assume that Ui is a non-negative strictly increasing
twice differentiable continuous concave function and that the right derivative at 0,
denoted by U'(0), exists and is finite. This agrees with intuition that consumers prefer
more to less, and that the marginal utility of a resource decreases with the amount
received (Law of Decreasing Return). We also assume that Ci is a, non-negative
strictly increasing differentiable convex function where Ci(S) = 0 for S < 0. This
agrees with intuition that suppliers have larger costs for supplying larger amounts of
resources, and that marginal production cost always increases as more resources are
being supplied because the production capacity is being pressed.
The market mechanism accepts all the consumer and supplier bids arid then sets
aggregate supply equal to aggregate demand to obtain the market clearing price,
Q R
mDjkcei = ( mcs uirs te
j=1 j=1
Q Rc 
j=1 WPM _ j=R /R -- 1 w
11Wt) P(W)
so
= R
Note that the market clearing price is a function of all the supplier and consumer
bids. Also note that all demand and supply functions have price, pL, and a bid, wi,
as arguments. Since price is a function of all bids, we will sometimes abuse notation
and use the shorthand Dib(t) for D (,(zn), wD ) and Si(nW) for Si([( c ), wti). Given the
way to have aggregate supply equal to aggregate demand is to set S = 0 and D = 0.
The mechanism also requires that the ith consumer 'pay' for their alotment in the
amount of 1 (iy)Di(). It asupplyier be compensated in the
amount of amount)S(). This scheme is price indiscriminant; all consumers (suppliers)
must pay (be compensated) at the same rate, p(zw).
Define the i th consumer payoff to be
PC (i) = U (Di(T)) - p(•)Di( )
Consumer payoff is the net gain of a consumer. The above definition is intuitive
because the consumer gains from utility in the amount of Ui(Dj(Wz)) but must pay
for the amount consumed, p(•W-)Di(-M).
Define the ith supplier payoff to be
Pf( ') = Y( )Si( ) - Ci(Si( ))
Supplier payoff is the net gain of a supplier. The above definition is intuitive because
the supplier gains from compensation in the amount of p(w')Si(zW) and has a cost
given by Ci(Sj(Wt)).
So far we have defined the players, payoffs, the parameterized supply and demand
functions, the market mechanism and laid out the assumptions of the utility and cost
functions.
3.3 Aggregate Payoff and Competitive Equilibrium
Aggregate payoff is defined as the sum of all the players payoffs. We will let J represent
aggregate payoff. When the market is cleared, it can be alternatively represented by
the aggregate utility minus the aggregate cost as shown below.
Q R
J(4) = +(E5) +P is( 0)
j=1 j=1
Q R
L (U,(Dj(0) -L•('W)Dj(W)) + E(p(i)Sj()S ) - Cj(Sj(W))))
j=1 j=1
Q R Q Q
L ZU (Dj(0)) -C c(Sj(2W)) + i(w)(L Sj(W') - Dj(0i))
j=1 j=1 j=1 j=1
Q R
= Uj (Dj (0) - Cj(Sj ())
j=1 j=1
Aggregate payoff of a. certain outcome, J(Q-) can be seen as the total social welfare
of the market.
A vector -om,,p is said to be a competitive equilibrium if each player maximizes
their payoff while treating the price as a constant. That is, ea.ch player acts as a.
price taker; they choose the best bid assuming their bid does not affect the market
clearing price. So the player sees his payoff only as a. function of her bid and the
price. 1p, not ui; that is, she sees payoff of the form U (Di(pL, w')) - pDj(i, wl) and
pSi(.(L, w1 I ) -- C(Si(p, wf)) and not like U (Di( )) - pDi( ) and yISi(z) - C (Si( )).
It has been shown by [6, 5] that in the one-sided mechanisms we are starting from,
Wco,,p exists and is actually a socially optimal outcome. It is our belief that a similar
result holds for our two-sided mechanism under consideration.
3.4 Existence of Nash Equilibrium
A vector ?tias,h is said to be a Nash equilibrium if it has the property that for each
player i, wi maximizes the ith player's payoff given -_-i. Intuitively, a Nash equilibrium
is a. set of bids such that no player can profitably deviate by changing his bid given
that all the other bids are constant. In a Nash equilibrium, players act as price
anticipators; they choose their bids knowing the effect they will have on the market
clearing price. A Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to be unique or to exist, so
in this section we will prove that given at least two suppliers and one consumer,
our two-sided market has a Nash equilibrium. We will first proceed by introducing
a game where every player's bid is restricted to the interval [e, M]. Then we show
sufficient conditions to apply Rosen's theorem to this [c, M] game. (Rosen's theorem
states a Nash equilibrium exists in every game in which the strategy space is compact
and convex and the payoff of each player is continuous and quasi-concave). Then we
use a limit argument by letting E -- 0 to show that there exists a Nash equilibrium
when every player's bidding interval is extended to [0, M]. We then show that it is
in no player's interest to bid above certain bounds in the [0, Mi] game when M is
large enough and there are at least two suppliers. By showing these strategic bids
are bounded, we argue that a Nash equilibrium for the [0, M] game when Al is large
enough is also a Nash equilibrium for the [0, c00) game when there are at least two
suppliers.
3.4.1 Step 1: Applying Rosen's Theorem
Let us introduce a modified game where every player's bidding interval is restricted
to [E, M], where 0 < e < M < oc. We will show there exists a. Nash equilibrium for
this game as a result of Rosen's Theorem. It immediately follows that the strategy
space of ea.ch player in this modified game is compact and convex because the bidding
interval for every player is the closed interval [e, M].
We now show the supplier and consumer payoff functions are concave by showing
the second derivative is non-positive. The demand function is given by:
Di ( (') ) =R i
Note that Di(w') is continuous when all the bids are restricted to [e, M]. Derivatives
of the demand function are given by:
a~j (W Q Wq +sj RDi() R j=1,i, wj + ~j=1
a (Z wI±c + RIW.)2
a2Di(W-) E9 1.3. Wý + R1
= -2R 3• 3+ w?Wc2 (sq 3Wy+ZERIW
Since all bids are restricted to [e, M], we have OD%( w) > 0 and '2()2 < 0. The
i
consumer payoff as a function of consumer's bids is given by:
Pc(iW') = UV(Dj(W')) - y(W')D((•)
= Uj(Dj(w')) 
- w'
Clearly, the payoff is continuous because Ui and Di are continuous and the composi-
tion of continuous functions is continuous as well. Derivatives of the payoff are given
by:
c( = Uj (Dj(w)) 1
a2PC(v) 2D () (2D ())
, = U'(Di( ))( i) + Uf(Di(-1)) 2Uý'(Oi + 
Now because we assumed Uj to be strictly increasing and concave and because
> 0 and < 0, we know that P 0 and thus that the consumer
al..C auC2 altyw -
payoff is concave with respect to her own bid. We will proceed in a similar fashion
for the supplier's payoff.
The supply function is given by:
SI() = 1 - W5 =1-R =Z
Note that S'(W') is continuous when all the bids are restricted to [e, M]. Its derivatives
are given by:
si(wE W + ER=I,ioj W,
_ _ - •=-R wJ wjawý (E% I Wc+ ERw
% 2R z% 3 +j=, Wj5)
-(Z%= 2R 3=1 + j= 1aWýi (E-q1 Wc  ER=I
Since all bids are restricted to [e, M], we have o() < 0 and ) > 0. The ithOwý awwisT-
supplier's payoff is given by:
P(i = -')Si( Ci(i('))
- -R -C(Si(0))
The payoff is continuous because Ci and Si are continuous, and the composition of
continuous functions is continuous as well. Derivatives of the payoff are given by:
PiS((W•) 1 -R C•S()
IO (So ( (0)4w9s R uuwa
i2P"(0) ,S40) 2 02Si,2 -C Si('))( ) + -Ci(Si( -)) & (2
Since we assumed Ci to be strictly increasing and convex and because oS,• < 0 and
&2 ,• > 0, we know that P < 0 and thus each supplier's payoff is concave with
respect to his own bid.
In this [r-, M] game where each players bidding interval is restricted to [e, M], we
have shown the strategy space is compact and convex and that all players payoff
functions are concave and continuous with respect to their own bid. This verifies the
conditions in Rosen's theorem and therefore shows a Na.sh Equilibrium exists for any
number of suppliers and consumers in this [l, M] game.
3.4.2 Step 2: Extending the bidding interval to [0, M]
In this section we will show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the [0, M] game.
We do this by creating a sequence of Nash equilibria from the [f, M] game as E -+ 0.
We show there exists a subsequence of this sequence which converges to some strategy,
and that this strategy satisfies the optimality conditions for a Nash equilibrium in
the [0, M] game. We thus obtain a Nash equilibrium for the [0, M] game.
In the previous section we showed that there exists a Nash equilibrium for the
[E, M] game. We denote such an equilibrium by Wnash(E). Let {jnash(Ek)} be a
sequence of these Nash equilibria based on the value of E where Ek = -. Note that
this sequence lies in a compact space because all bids lie in the interval [0, M] (the
finite Cartesian product of closed intervals is compact). Now, because {'f'ash(Ek)}
is a sequence in a compact space, we know that some subsequence of {Wnash(Ek)}
converges to a vector W* in our [0, M] strategy space. Showing that W* satisfies the
optimality conditions for Nash equilibrium in the [0, M] game will imply that W* is a
Nash equilibrium for the [0, M] game.
In the [Ek, M] game, {'nash(Ck)} must satisfy the following optimality conditions:
w (P I =r"ah(fk) < 0 if Wi,nash(fk) = fk
I~q)=nassh(-k) = 0 if 6k < Wi,nash(lk) < M
awi
wi t=Vl..anL(sEk) > 0 if Wi,nash(Ek) = M
Plugging in for the payoff functions, we get:
if Wuiih (6k) = F
U' (R Q 1(E) R 
-1 k) I < 0
___ (C E ±Z7 1. u(k)±Z 3 1"60
if wk < I (11) < M
(~RE I- O ()) ER kW -[E)± 1 ( k)
= )1 s) ((+ERcl k)+ 1 ) (k0)
if Wk < (6kA,,) - < :
M( R - =.( -Ck ) 1 < (k) (Alf + 1w k )(• w ( 6k)( l 1( 1
if w nash U - Z 7-)R - j w"tk) ±Zj W 5(C k)(1 (k) R 1 i w(C k)+ = 1 t 1(E k))
k;Q 
- R 1=1 )k) 
R
if W,nash(Ck) 31:
1,j i -(6k) -=1 W ('Ek) 1
Taking the limit as k -- 0 along a subsequence for which tiV,nassh(E) converges to J*,
we get the following conditions:
if w 6,C 0:. OU,/ (I0)RR j 1 + 1 < 0R lý EOEQ 1 lcUc R- <
.-- j=.lji ;c q-k-1 s  1 j=1 0CO
if 0 < W h( < :
UC (I R (Ek) Y .R R-J - 1s = 0
if wi' - I
if wi*  - 0: S;-1E + RI _CZ- (1) --- " +E , <  0 , WC(Ek))
=1= 1 * 3 •:
if w*"inh( = AM :
O,1 R-R nA R =JiI+ I-> 0j1- +El,jfiw +EClw c  (nj+E•R =tiW*s+E(2l;c)2 .R_ .
These conditions hold as long as Q wI c + XR 1 Vw S $ 0. We will now show W?* #
by showing E,= I Wi'ah(6k) + Ej1W •nash(k) > c > 0 for all k where c is some
positive finite constant. If any player's bid is M in the Nash equilibrium for the
[E, M] game, then the sum of all players bids is also bounded by M in the Nash
equilibrium. However, if no player bids M in the Nash equilibrium for the [e, M]
game, then from the Nash equilibrium conditions we must have jP0(5(k)) < 0 for
every consumer i. This gives:
,Rwc,nash(k) + X cc,( R as k) R 3j=l,ij Wjnash(Ek) ± =1 Wjnash(Ek)
U =1 Wj,nash(Ek) +j=1,nash Wc(Ek) (Ej=1 'j,nash(Ek) + =1 Wjnash(Ek)) - 0
The market mechanism sets aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply, and since
the maximum amount supplied by each supplier is one, demand is upper bounded by
R. Also, since U is concave and strictly increasing, we have 0 < U'(R) < U'(A) <
U'(0) where 0 < A < R. Applying this to the inequality above yields:
j=l,iAj Wjnsh(Ek) + =1 Wjcnash(Ek) 1 0V
(ZQ=1 Wj,nash(k) j= Z W,na,,sh(Ek)) 2  RU(R)
Adding all Q of these inequalities together (one for each consumer), we get:
(Q - 1) Z= Wjinash(k) j=l Wj,nash <(k)
(Ej= 1 Wj,nash(Ek) T j= 1 W,nash( Ek)) f
where f is some finite positive constant. Since all bids are non-negative, this implies:
(Qf- 1)(E•=l wnash(Ek) -=1 W,nash(Ck))
(j=1 Wfnash(Ek) + W,nash k))
So,
(Q - Q R
< :nash (k) + E Wj,nash( k)
j= 1 j=1
This means that for Q > 2, zE- 1LI.nash(( ) + 1 w,nash(Ek) > c > 0. We leave
as a conjecture that this is true for Q -= 1. Since we have shown ~E Q ash(fk) +
=j=, wi,,,ash (6k) > c > 0 for all k. in taking the limit as k- - oc, we know wB* $ 0.
Since z-* is not equal to 0, we know t7* always sa~tisfies the previous conditions. These
previous conditions are also the same conditions for a Nash equilibrium in the [0, M]
game. We have thus shown that L7'* is a strategy which satisfies the optimality condi-
tions for Nash equilibrium in the [0, M] game, which shows 'z* is a Nash equilibrium
for the [0, 1M] game.
3.4.3 Step 3: Extending the bidding interval to [0, oo)
Consider a n,,ah which is a Nash equilibrium for the [0, M] game in step 2; we want
to show that when M is large enough, Wnah is a Nash equilibrium for the game where
all players bids are restricted to [0, oo), assuming there exist at least two suppliers.
Let a rational bid for player i be a bid which maximizes the players payoff, Pi, given
everyone elses bid. We start by analyzing the payoff functions to get a bound on the
rational bids for the [0, M] game when M is large. By showing these rational bids
are bounded, we argue that a Nash equilibrium for the [0, M] game when M is large
enough is also a Nash equilibrium for the [0, oo) game.
The i t h consumer payoff is given by:
PiC(?W) = Ui(Di(0)) - [(W)Dii(W) = U (Di( )) - wu
If wf = 0, then PC(i5) = Ui(D(0, 'cz)) - 0 = Uj(0). Since aggregate supply must
equal aggregate demand and because S < 1, we know aggregate demand cannot
exceed the total number of suppliers, R. This implies that Uj(Dj(-dv)) 5 Uj(R) for all
possible T'. Next note that if wc > Uj(R) > Uj(Di(O)), then PRC(w) < 0. Since the ith
consumer's payoff is non-negative when w' is zero (we assumed U to be non-negative),
it is never in the ith consumer's interest to bid more than U,(R), because the payoff
would then be negative. So the rational it h consumer will never choose to bid above
U,(R), because choosing a bid of w' = 0 will always result in a higher payoff. So a
bid wii which is greater than ma.x Ui(R) is never a. rational bid for any consumer in
the [0, M] game when Al is large enough because letting w' = 0 will always yield a
higher payoff.
A similar argument holds for the supplier. We will first note for the [0, oo) game
with only one supplier, the supplier payoff is given by
Q F9=l
j=l W +T Ej=I W3
Given wl = N and w' > 0 for at least one consumer, the supplier is always better off
choosing wM above N because Pj is strictly increasing with wM. This means that for
a single supplier, there exists no Nash equilibrium because there exists no supplier
bid that maximizes the supplier payoff function. Intuitively, a single supplier does
not lead to a Nash equilibrium in the [0, oc) game because a single supplier has no
competition so she has the ability to increase her bid without worry, so there is no
bound on the 'best bid'.
Assuming R > 2, we will now show there exists a finite bound on w' for which
no rational supplier will bid above in the [0, M] game when M is large. We first note
that the supplier payoff is given by:
9 1 R s3 1 Rwý
= w j=,jWj + - -C(1-
If wm = 0, then P 8(0, 0j) ' 2 + =,," - Ci(1) (there is inequality because if
WG•i = , then supply and thus cost become zero). Now note that Ci is non-negative,
so RP(z•) <_ Zj=l Y j+=•Pj=. ; • i ± +( - 1)w in general. This implies if wý > RCi(1),
then Pi (w) < R + (R - 1)C(1). Since the i h supplier's payoff is
greater when ws = 0 than when wý > RCi(1) and R > 2, it is never in the ith
suppliers interest to bid more than RC(1) when there is more than one supplier
because the ith supplier can always increase her payoff by submitting w' = 0 (Note
this breaks down for R = 1). So, a. bid w' which is greater than Rmaxi Ci(R) is
never a. rational bid for any supplier in the [0, M] game when R > 2 and M is large
because letting w' = 0 will always yield a higher payoff for the supplier.
In the previous section we have shown there exists a Nash equilibrium for the
[0. AI] game. By showing that there exists a finite bound above which no consumer or
supplier would rationally submit a bid in the [0, M] game when R > 2 and AlM is large
enough shows the Nash equilibrium for the [0, M] game is also a Nash equilibrium for
the [0, oc) game assuming there exist at least two suppliers.
3.5 Changing Utility and Cost Functions to In-
crease Efficiency Loss
We are interested in finding the worst-case efficiency loss of this mechanism because
this will tell us in the worst case how much payoff is lost when every player acts
selfishly relative to the maximum possible payoff. This helps to shed light on whether
decentralization in a market of this type is a good or bad idea. In this section we
analyze how to change utility and cost functions to increase efficiency loss while
keeping the same Nash equilibrium. We will find that linear utility functions and
piecewise linear cost functions will lead to greater efficiency loss than non-linear utility
and cost functions with the same Nash equilibrium. This analysis will help bolster
our intuition of the market mechanism. The argument for the utility functions is the
same as in [5].
We will start with the analysis of utility functions. We have assumed the ith utility
function is a non-negative strictly increasing continuous concave function defined on
D > 0. Let. wnash be the ith consumer's bid in a Nash equilibrium and let w' 0o be
the i•h consumer's bid which leads to a socially optimal outcome. We will represent
the iZh consumer's demand at these outcomes by Di,soc and Di,nash. Let us introduce
a, modified game where Ui is linearized about Di,a,,,,h. Call this new utility function
UiO"d. It is obvious that both games contain a common Nash equilibrium because
the derivative of the utility function is the same at Di.nash in both the initial and
modified games. Since Usod(D h,,,) = U'i(Di.nash), the same set of bids t,,sh will
Original and Modfied Utility Function
Figure 3-1: Linearization of the utility function. Note how U[nod > Ui
satisfy the optimality conditions for Nash equilibrium in both games. Now note that
the modified utility function has increased on the entire range because linearizing a
non-decreasing concave function results in a function that is larger or equal to the
unmodified function on all points in the range. This implies that U•lod > Ui with
equality occuring at Di,nash. Also note that changing the utility functions has no
effect on the supplier payoff (Ps has no terms involving U), so rational supplier bids
will be the same in both games. This shows that there is the same Nash equilibrium
in the two games: one with unmodified cost and utility functions and one with a
linearized ith utility function about Di,nash.
Since UiOd(Di,nash) = Ui(Di,nash) and the cost functions are unchanged, the aggre-
gate surplus in a Nash equilibrium remains unchanged when the ith utility function is
linearized about the corresponding Di,nash. This means that J(nash) = Jmod(Wnah)
(remember J is aggregate payoff). However, U7 od > Ui, so we have Jmod(t') Ž J(p)
for all feasible w'. Efficiency is defined as g h) and since Jmod( mp) J(comnp)
and Jmod(W nash) = J(nash), linearizing the ith utility function will only decrease
efficiency.
Now that we have shown linearizing the ith utility function to the form Ui(D) =
aiD + bi decreased efficiency, we will show that modifying the ith utility function
again to the form Ui(D) = aiD so that Ui(O) = 0 will further decrease efficiency.
Since the modification is just a. constant shift of the utility function, it does not affect
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Figure 3-2: Affine shift of utility function where Uiod + bi = Ui
the derivative of the utility function at any point and so the same Wnash satisfies the
optimality conditions for Nash equilibrium in both games. It is also obvious that both
games have the same set of bids which result in a socially optimal outcome. This
means that, although wnash and soc remain unchanged, J(wnash) and J(toc) both
decrease by bi. Ala Jmod(Wnash) = J(nash) - bi and Jmod( = J(so,) - bi. So
the new efficiency is given by gJoas)-bi which is less thang(nash) because J(Wnash) <
J(G 0oc). So linearizing the i th utility function and then shifting it by a constant so that
Ui(0) = 0 will decrease efficiency further. Any further shifts downward to decrease
efficiency will break our assumption that U is non-negative. Given a game with
utilities and costs specified, linearizing the utility function about a Nash eqilibium
and shifting it so that U(0) = 0 yields the worst case efficiency of all games with
the same Nash equlibrium and cost functions. Basically, this is the worst efficiency
possible by changing our utility functions within the constraints of our assumptions
and keeping the same Nash equilibrium. If we allow our Nash equilibrium to change,
we can further decrease efficiency by playing with the slopes of our utility functions.
This will be shown in a. numerical excercise in section 6.3.
We will now analyze the cost functions in an analogous fashion. We have assumed
that every cost function is a strictly increasing convex function where Ci(S) = 0 for
S < 0. Let u'i,,,sh be the i th supplier's bid in a Nash equilibrium and let .',.so0 be the
ith supplier's bid in a. socially optimal outcome. Let us introduce a modified game
where Ci is linearized about Si(W'nash) and then floored with a small linear function
aS where ac is small enough to keep the convexity assumtions. It is obvious that both
Original ard Modified Cost Function
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Figure 3-3: Piecewise linearization of the cost function
the initial and modified game share a Nash equilibrium because the derivatives of
the cost functions remain the same at Si(lnash). This means Wnash satisfies the opti-
mality conditions for Nash equilibrium in both the modified and unmodified games.
Now note that the modified cost function has decreased on the entire range because
linearizing and flooring the cost function as above results in a function that is smaller
than or equal to the unmodified function on all points in the range. This implies
that Ciod < Ci with equality occuring at Si('Wnash). Since J(' nash) did not change
value and J(UGloc) increased, this modification to the cost function will only decrease
efficiency. Any further changes to decrease the cost function will either break con-
vexity or other assumptions we have made. So given a, game with utility and costs
specified, linearizing, shifting, and flooring the utility and cost functions about a Nash
equilibrium will yield a, modified game which will have the worst case efficiency loss
of all games with that Nash equilibrium. It should be noted though that further
efficiency loss can be gained by changing the slopes of the utility or cost functions.
This changes the Nash equilibrium and so is not covered by the above analysis, but
we will go through some examples of this type of change in the next section.
3.6 Numerical Examples
In this section we will go through several numerical examples to gain insight into the
market mechanism. We will first go through a simple example and explicitly show
the steps to compute efficiency loss. We then proceed by looking at more complex
examples and gain intuition about how efficiency loss changes with different market
setups. Due to the complexity of these examples, we will not explictly show the steps;
instead we will rely on a Matlab simulation to give our results.
3.6.1 Example: One Consumer and Two Suppliers
Our simple example will be a market consisting of two suppliers with identical quadratic
costs and a single consumer with linear cost. Explicitly, the utility and costs functions
are given by:
UI(D) = D
C1(S) = C2(S) = S2
The market clearing price is given by /(wi) = wl+wiw. We will start our analysis2
with the competitive equilibrium, where each player acts as a price taker. That is,
each player sees the market clearing price as a constant, p. The payoffs for this setup
are given by:
PIt(1., w') = U,(D 1 (it, w')) - 1pD1(M , w') = - ,L'w
P1s (it WD) -- S 1(u, w 1) - Ci (SP1(,)) -= Y - W (1
2P2S(p, wi) = pS2(I., u. ) - C2( 2(IL, w)) = P - W-(1 -
Each player will choose a bid to optimize their payoff function with / as constant.
Taking the derivatives of the payoff functions, we get:
PF' (i, wD) = - - 1
2 wS
P'"(p, w) = -1+ -(1 - AI)
2 wS
P' (pw" ) = 1 + - (1 - )
Setting these equal to zero and checking that our values don't lie outside the boundary,
we get that Lcomp=, w1,comp, = 1,p = - This gives an aggregate
surplus of UI(D(1, 1)) - C 1 (S(1, -)) - C 2 (S(1, )) = 1 - 1 1 - 12
Now we will analyze the Nash equilibrium where each player acts as a price antic-
ipator. That is, each player sees the market clearing price as a function of their own
bids. The payoffs are given by:
w
Pfc (Wi) = U, (D (0))   W ) - )D, () = -w_ w
2
w , + w + w8 , w 2
2Pj(i) = A(?)s1(•) - cs + w2 +  -- - - _++ )
P A(t() = tg)S 2( ) - C2(2()) = 1 22 2 ++__1__
2
Taking derivatives and setting them equal to zero gives rise to long expressions. Af-
ter some algebra, the answer turns out to be ,,ash = .719, WFC,nah = .404, wS,nash =
W~,nash = .517. This gives an aggregate surplus of U1(DI(Wnash)) - Cl(S1(W'nash)) -
C2(S2(Wnash)) = .404. Taking the ratio of J(Gnash) and J(icomp) gives an efficiency
loss of 20%. Notice that J( zlash) is less than J(iL~omp). This is because the com-
petitive equilibrium maximizes aggregate payoff and so J(tn7ash) < J(~comp). In the
next example we will look at the outcomes with different numbers of suppliers and
consumers and observe what happens to the efficiency loss.
3.6.2 Numerical Simulation
In the following sections we will go through examples that are very difficult to solve
analytically, so we will rely on a computer program to solve these problems numeri-
cally. The program takes an initially chosen arbitrary strategy z and then for each
player i, finds di which is the derivative of the i th player's payoff function given the
current ui_,. We chose the next Vi to be the old WV plus a small step in the -d direc-
tion. We repeat this process until the maximum change of any players bid is no more
than 6.
While max, i dil > 6
For each player i
a.4 i =
End For
For each player i
wi = Wi - E - di
End For
End While
If this process converges, it stops at a strategy where for each player i, the it h player
has no incentive to change his bid to something outside the interval [wi - 6, w, + 6].
When 6 is small, this approximates the conditions of a Nash equilibrium. So if w'
converges when 6 is small, the vector w' can be viewed as an approximate Nash
equilibrium. We will apply this algorithim to the examples coming up in the next
sections in order to aid us in finding the efficiency loss.
3.6.3 Example: Q Consumers and R Suppliers
We will now extend the previous example to an arbitrary number of suppliers and
consumers where there are Q consumers with identical linear utilities, Ui(D) = D, and
R suppliers with identical quadratic costs, CO(S) = S 2. When we apply our algorithim
and solve for the efficiency loss, we find some interesting but expected results. Below
is a graph showing the efficiency loss for different Q's and R's (see graphs). Note that
when Q = 1 and R -- oo the efficiency approaches 88%. When R = 2 and Q -- 00 the
efficiency approaches 93%. When R -+ oo and Q -+ 0o the efficiency approaches 1.
Note that efficiency monotonically increases with both R and Q. This makes intuitive
sense because whenever another player enters the market, competition increases and
so the market power of the players decreases and the efficiency increases. Also, when
R -* oc and Q -+ oc, there are so many players that no one player can exert any
type of market power because there is perfect competition. So as more players enter
Efficiency with the same number of suppliers and consumers
2U 40 6U UU
N b f~ rSPInlia ~rv d·m~ N rnc b f C 100
Efficiency with two suppliers and an arbitrary number of consumers
0o 92
09
6 0 88
0.84
0.82
S 2 .
-
mer a onsurers 0 20 40 60
Number of Consumers
Efficiency with one consumer and an arbitrary number of suppliers
80 100
80 100
Figure 3-4: Efficiency with different number of suppliers and consumers
the market, the efficiency always increases, and in the limit the efficiency goes to 1.
3.6.4 Example: Consumers With Different Linear Utilities
In this section we analyze what happens when consumers have different linear utili-
ties versus when they have identical linear utilities. We would expect that different
utility functions among consumers will lead to lower efficiency than if all utilities were
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identical because the assymetry of utilities will cause more market power to be used.
This is precisely what we find when we run our Matlab program. With five consumers
with utilities given by U;(D) = D and five suppliers with costs given by Ci(S) = S2
we find the efficiency to be 97.1%.
When we change the first utility function to be Ui(D) = 2D we expect that this
consumer will now exert more market power over the other players because his utility
for every received amount is higher. This is precisely what we find; the efficiency
becomes 72.1%. In the competitive equilibrium, all supply is given to this more eager
utility.
Now we will change the first utility function to UI (D) = D and leave the other
four at Ui(D) = D. We predict that the efficiency will again decrease because now
the first player is effectively not in the game. This first player will receive no supply in
the competitive equilibrium, and receives very little in the Nash equilibrium. Indeed,
the efficiency for this setup is 96.6%, only slightly lower than our original case. In
order to check our intuition, we run the game with four identical consumers and five
identical suppliers. We would expect the efficiency to be nearly the same because we
have taken out an inert player. Our intuition comes through; the efficiency loss in
this case is 96.6%.
So when there are consumers with identical utility functions, we can decrease
the efficiency in one of two ways. We can make a consumer's utility very small so
she is effectively removed from the game. This will decrease efficiency because we
have numerically shown efficiency is monotonically increasing with the number of
consumers. We can also make a consumer's utility larger. This will effectively make
her a stronger player and more likely to bid higher for the supply. This asymetry
in turn reduces the market power of all other utilities and significantly decreases the
efficiency.
3.7 A Zero Efficiency Case
In this example we carefully look at an example where efficiency goes to zero and try
to best understand why this occurs. The setup for a simple zero efficiency game is a
one consumer and two supplier game with the following utility and cost functions:
UI(D)
C1(S) = C2(S)
=aD
=S if S < .5
= 2S-.5ifS > .5
We will assume 1 < a < ." It should be noted that this example uses an example
of the 'bad' cost and utility functions we found in section 5. Let u be the unit step
function. Looking at the competitive equilibrium where players are price takers, we
have the following payoff functions:
awe
Pjc(y, w') = U (Di (y, w')) - w w = -
Pý,(I,,wf) = iS(p,wf) - Ci(SI(p, w ))
= - -(1- .5(1 2(1- .5 (1-.5
P"(P, w) = S2( )-c1(S2(,))
= -W2 --(I 2)u .5-(1
Optimizing, we get that p =com  a, ,co p  a, w.cop comp =. This implies
S1 = S2 = . Also, Pand DP lomp , = 1. This gives an
aggregate surplus of J( 0co,,,p) = (a - 1). It is interesting to note that when /a = a,
the consumer payoff always zero and independent of his bid uw.
w* w w)+ 2(1- 2 ).5)u((1 - ) .5
P ,P
Now we will analyze the Nash equilibrium. We have:
2aw.zi"
pic(·2) = aw ?~ + wZL + u,1 '1 2
p ) w + w1 + wI
-
wl 
-1Pi W) 2 i -L+W+ ) .5 - (1
2
- +W )+
2
2(1 - w± )
2
w_ + w_ + w s _1
= 2 - w 2- - )u.5 - (1-
2
W2
2
22(1 - )
2
2)+w2+w+wi )±
2
- 5)
We write down the Nash equilibrium conditions and solve them to find we,nash =
4a(a- 1) S 3 4a 2a(a2+l)
4(a+,) sna s = 4 and nash = (a) when a is close to 1. This
2(a3-a2-a+1)
gives an aggregate surplus of J(W'nash) - 2(a2--a-+1)2. Demand and supply are given
2
-1 and D_2(a 2 -1
by S1 = S2 = 1 and D1 - 2+1
Taking J(.""h) yields an efficiency of 2(-2 -1). Note that efficiency goes to 0J(asom) (graph below. Using our Matlab program, we also find that this efficiency
as a 1 1. See graph below. Using our Matlab program, we also find that this efficiency
Figure 3-5: Efficiency as a function of a in the zero efficiency case
goes to 0 as a 1 1 for any number of suppliers and consumers (R > 2).
Notable characteristics of this zero-efficiency case is that as a 1 1, then both
J(fcomp) -- 0 a.nd ,J(,ash) -- 0. The rea.son why efficiency goes to zero is simply
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because J('Wnash) converges faster. Below are the reaction curves for the game with
identical suppliers costs and consumer utilities. These reactions curves show that as
)
conMnsors bid
Figure 3-6: Reaction curves of supplier and consumers for values of 'a' from 1 to 1.5
a 1 1, then the consumers bid tends towards zero and the suppliers bids tend toward
one. This makes sense; as a tends toward one, there is less incentive for players to
be in the game and these bids begin to approach a zero aggregate surplus scenario
where nothing is traded. You can see the progression of these choices as a decreases
by looking at the sequence of intersections on the reaction curve graph. Beyond this,
we have not dug any deeper as to the reasons behind this zero efficiency case; this
will make an interesting extension to this analysis.
3.8 Alternate Two-sided Mechanisms and Their
Efficiency Loss
In this section, we will look at alternate two-sided mechanisms which mantain the
flavor of Johari's one-sided mechanisms and analyze their worst case efficiency. The
first mechanism we look at has each supplier submit a multidimensional bid instead of
a single dimensional bid. We then look at a two-stage mechanism where the suppliers
submit their bids and then consumers submit their bids and vice versa. It turns out
that these new mechanisms have a. worst case efficiency which approaches zero as
well.
3.8.1 Multidimensional Bidding Mechanism
We introduce a new mechanism where each consumer i still submits a. single bid. wi ,
to the mechanism, but each supplier i now submits two bids, w' and a, to the market
mechanism where both wi and ai are non-negative. Demand and supply are now
determined by:
wi
= ai - _ _
The market mechanism sets aggregate demand equal to aggregate supply to determine
price. So,
IQ Ojc +E I
If Zj-L aI == 0 , or +1 wý+ 1 w =- 0, then the market mechanism sets /(P, ) =
0, Di(W, 6) = 0, Si(w', ) = 0 for all i. We keep the same assumptions on the cost and
utility functions. The idea behind this market mechanism is to allow the supplier an
extra degree of freedom by letting them choose the maximum amount supplied, a.
Nash Equilibrium with One Supplier and One Consumer
We will show this game has a Nash equilibrium with one supplier and one consumer.
Then, using our intuition from the previous market mechanism, we will create a setup
where efficiency approaches 0. To show there exists a Nash equilibrium we first look
at the payoff functions with one consumer and one supplier.
PI(7i, aI) = U 1 (DIl(z,1 ai)) - Dil(W', a•l)p(t-, a1 ) = U,( W,) - U
Pis(~da,) = S,( a1 )p.('I-, o•1 ) - C,(S 1(',,0C1)) = LI" - C,( u,u-C +"i
Notice that the supplier payoff function is strictly monotonically increasing in w'
and strictly monotonically decreasing in ac (remember CI is strictly monotonically
increasing). The payment to the supplier from the consumer, Sp = w', is not a
function of the supplier's bid in this case. This means to maximize her payoff function,
the supplier must minimize her cost. She can do this in one of two ways, either by
letting w' - oo or setting ac = 0. Minimizing C1 ( )""(: over w' E [0, oc) and
a, [(0, oc) gives that cost can go as low as zero when a1 = 0 (w' can be anything).
Given al = 0, Pfc = Ui(0) - w', which is maximized when wc = 0. So w' = 0, a1 = 0,
wi E (0, 00) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As a final note, notice that this
scenario breaks down when there is more than one supplier because the 'payment'
to the supplier, Sp, becomes a function of supplier bids, and maximizing the payoff
functions is not as trivial.
A Zero Efficiency Case
We will now give an example where efficiency goes to 0. We will assume the game
has one supplier and one consumer and the costs are given by:
U (D) = aD
C1(S) = S
The payoffs then become:
Pf(P,5)= aw1a lCC I
wl +wl
wP(a) wi + wS
As show previously, wc = 0, a, = 0, and w, E (0, oo00) is a Nash equilibrium which
results in a net payoff of zero. However, the expression for aggregate payoff is given
by:
(a + 1)wcai
wI' + W5
This expression can be made arbitrarily large with a suitable choice of ac. This shows
that the efficiency in this case is equal to 0. However, this case has only one supplier
and one consumer. It turns out if we let there be Q consumers and R suppliers and
they bid symmetrically, aggregate payoff is given by J(G., d) = Ra(R ,,, ) - R.
This can be arbitrarily large with the correct choice of a. It thus turns out that this
mechanism has a worst case efficiency loss of 1 with R suppliers and Q consumers.
3.8.2 Two-Stage Bidding Mechanism
We will now consider some two-stage mechanisms where the consumer and supplier
groups bid sequentially and all assumptions on rationality and on utility and cost
functions still hold. At first, we will consider a mechanism where all consumers
submit their bid in the first time slot and then all suppliers submit their bid in the
second time slot. This can be modeled as a sequential game with two stages. The
difference with this game is that the suppliers submit their bids knowing what every
consumer bid and the consumers know the suppliers will react rationally to their
actions. It is interesting to note that the aggregate payoff in the socially. optimal
outcome does not change from our initally proposed mechanism because our strategy
space and payoff functions remain unchanged.
A Zero Efficiency Example
We will now run through an example which helps us understand this mechanism and
shows a case where efficiency approaches zero. Consider a market with Q consumers
and R suppliers and where U (D) = aD for all i and Ci(S) = S for all i. We first
analyze what the supplier reactions will be given the consumers bids. We do this by
maximizing Pf over w-.
pi.(t) (t)(1 w C(1
45
Taking the derivative and assuming symetry gives:
OP; (U!) 1 + (Rw"O + Qw") R - Rw-"
-= -- 1+Ow R (Rws + Qwc)2
Setting the derivative to zero and solving for u!" yields,
(1 - R)(2Qw - R) + ((R -1) 2(2Qwc - R)2- 4R(R - 1)[(Qwc) 2( - - QR ]
2R(R -1)
So this will be every supplier's rational reaction given the consumer's bids. The
consumers know this as well and will choose their bids to maximize their payoff given
this knowledge.
SaRw' cfc(•) = Wc + ER W _ •Z5= 1 wL + = w( i)
Now we take the derivative remembering that supplier bids are now a function of
consumer bids.
aPic( ) ( = w• + Z= 1 wjs(W))aR - aRwc( +i+aZ.j 1 wji(N))
tW' -Ej~l W, - -1
-1
Setting this equal to zero gives an expression with many complicated terms. By
creating a simulation simular to before in Matlab (all we have to do is modify our
expression for the derivative of the consumer's payoff) and letting a approach 1, we
find this example has an efficiency loss which approaches one, similar to the previous
examples. It also turns out that if we consider the other two-stage mechanism where
suppliers bid first and consumers bid second, we get the same efficiency loss result.
3.9 Conclusions and Extensions
We initially proposed a two-sided market mechanism based on the one-sided market
mechanisms found in Johari's thesis [5]. After describing the mechanism, we showed
there exists a Nash equilibrium, as long as there are at least two suppliers in the
market. Then we described different pathological utilities and costs which increase
efficiency loss. After going through a few numerical examples to boost our intuition,
we lay out a. case which gives zero efficiency. We then looked at alternate two-sided
mechanisms like two-stage and multidimensional bidding mechanisms and showed
those mechanisms also have a worst case efficiency that approaches zero. The results
are negative for our two-sided mechanisms under consideration. Future research can
explore if any general statements can be about efficiency loss in two-sided markets.
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Chapter 4
Some Supply-Side Market
Mechanisms in a Network Setting
In this chapter we introduce two mechanisms to distribute resources in supply-side
markets in a. competitive network setting. The mechanisms we create are similar to
the ones presented by Kelly and Johari [6, 5]. We are motivated to create these supply-
side mechanisms because they can be used to describe situations where demand is
inelastic or non-responsive like in a power network. In a power network, generators
compete to meet a fixed demand at several locations. Demand is fixed because there
is no way for consumers to react to the spot price of power. In the rest of the chapter
we will create two mechanisms which model this type of scenario.
We will first create a mechanism based on the market mechanism found in Johari's
thesis [5]. In this mechanism, each supplier submits a bid to each demand source. At
each demand source there is a mechanism which sets aggregate supply equal to the
fixed amount of demand at the source. The cost incurred by each supplier is a func-
tion of the amount supplied to each demand source. The second mechanism under
consideration is a. Kelly-like mechanism where every supplier submits a one dimen-
sional bid to the market mechanism which parameterizes her own cost function. The
market mechanism then solves an optimization problem which minimizes aggregate
cost while ensuring supply meets demand at every location.
4.1 Supply-Side Mechanism with Multidimensional
Bids
In this section we will describe a mechanism where each supplier submits a multidi-
mensional bid to the market mechanism and then ensures aggregate supply matches
demand at each demand source. This mechanism is inspired by a type of situation
where a factory (supplier) can produce multiple types of goods and sells each type
of goods to different demand sources. It could also represent a simple model of a
powergrid where different generators sell power to different cities. The production
costs of these goods are coupled and are described by the supplier's cost function.
Let R be the number of suppliers (assumed to be greater than one) and Q be the
Figure 4-1: Graphical Representation of Market Setup
number of demand sources. Every supplier i submits a non-negative bid representing
their supply function for the market at demand source j, denoted by wj. So every
supplier i is in fact submitting a multidimensional bid {w1, w,..., w} to the mar-
ket mechanism. We call the set of bids directed at demand source j by wJ. That is,
u j = {wI , W,...,w }. The amount demanded at each demand source j is given by
Dj. The market mechanism determines the amount each supplier i supplies to each
demand source j by:
SI (OL
j ) - Dj
When pjj(, ) = 0, we define S(·(wJ) = 0 for all i. Notice the maximum amount
avaliable for supply by a single supplier is Dj. This is to ensure a market clearing
outcome is feasible. The market mechanism clears the market by setting aggregate
supply equal to demand at each demand source (i.e., ~-=l S (wJ) = Dj). This gives
a market clearing price at demand source j of:
(R - 1)Dj
So there will be a total of Q market clearing prices, one for each demand source. It is
as if there are Q separate markets, but coupled together by supplier costs. The cost
incurred by supplier i is given by Ci(S 1,S, ... ,S.) and is a function of the amount
supplied to each demand source. We assume that Ci is a non-negative, convex function
that is strictly increasing with respect to all its arguments. The payoff function for
each supplier is nearly identical to as before. Supplier i is paid for the amount supplied
at every demand source in the aggregate amount of E,= pj (w)Sj (wi) while incurring
a cost of C.i(Si, S/,.. . , S). This gives a total payoff for supplier i of:
Q
Pi(wi) = Zi ij(wJ)SJ(w- ) - C(S , 2'S,.. . ,S q )
j=1
4.1.1 An Example
To illustrate this mechanism we will go through a simple example. Let R = 3 and
Q = 2 and also let the cost equal the sum of the supply. That is let Ci(S1, S) =
Si1 + S2 for all i. Also, let D1 = D2 = 1.
The market clearing prices are given by:
U.1 + w3 + w.j (w-v) = - for j = l and 2
Costs a.re given by:
1 2
C ), S(()) = - +1 for i = 1, 2, and 3
p. ('1) 2(•Z2)
Payoffs are the given by:
PW(vi) = (i/_(wl) - 1)Si'(w1 ) + (pi(w2) - 1)S(w 2) for i = 1, 2, and 3
As before, the set of bids which maximizes aggregate payoff is the socially optimal
solution. A Nash equilibrium (if it exists) can be similarly found by finding the
outcome so that no one supplier can change her multidimensional bid to increase her
payoff. We only present the mechanism here with no particular results. Although, we
know from Johari if Q = 1, the worst case efficiency loss is given by + [5]. It is an
interesting future research direction to find significant results about the efficiency loss
of this more general mechanism. Another interesting research direction is to consider
a mechanism where the consumers and suppliers are not fully connected. That is, we
could consider when some suppliers do not have the ability to supply to a particular
demand source.
4.2 Supply Side Mechanism With Single Dimen-
sional Bids
In a network with many consumers, submitting a bid for every demand source may
be unrealistic and too complicated, so we create a simpler market mechanism where
a supplier submits only a one-dimensional bid.
Let R be the number of suppliers and Q be the number of demand sources. Every
supplier i submits a non-negative bid to the market mechanism, denoted by w,. The
amount demanded at each demand source j is given by Dj. Let A be a Q x R matrix
which determines how supply is distributed to the demand sources. The vector of
amount supplied at each demand source is given by AS where S is the supply vector.
The market mechanism determines the price, p, and the amount each supplier i
supplies by solving the following optimization problem:
R
min Q C(Si( W))
i=1
s.t. AS> D
Q
where S(wV) =Q D- wi
j=1 Y(W)
In other words, the market mechanism minimizes the aggregate cost required to have
supply meet demand. There is only one market clearing price in the market and it is
obtained by solving the optimization above. This is unlike the previous mechanism
which had a different price at each demand source.
In previous mechanisms in this thesis, the suppliers bid has parameterized a family
of supply functions which the market mechanism uses to set aggregate demand to
aggregate cost. In this mechanism takes another viewpoint and actually sees the cost
functions as being parameterized. Marginal cost at some amount supplied is the same
as price at some amount supplied. Given this relationship, we have:
dC (Si(0•) wS
dS(zi) - I Dj - S,(v)
which yeilds
Q WS
Ci(Si(M))= -wS ln( Dj - Si(t)) = -w' ln( )
j=1 ( )
The above gives a parameterized family of cost functions which the market mechanism
uses in its optimization.
Payoffs for each supplier i are given by:
Q
P(U?) L p (z'()Ajy, Si(W) - C (Si(z)))
j=1
This structure is intuitive; the supplier i is paid for the amount supplied to each
demand source j in the amount of p(W)AjiSi( ) and at an incurred cost of Ci(S1(')).
4.2.1 An Example
To illustrate this mechanism we go through a simple example. Let D1 = 1, D2 = 1.
and A = 3 3 . The market mechanism will now solve the following problem:
S1n(1) ln -2 wln( 3(01min C(S (f)) = -w 1  - w2  3
s.t. 2 - >
2 0 1 tLO)13 3 2- w
Given w', the market mechanism will solve the above problem by finding the optimal
I(5). Each supplier must then supply the amount given by Sj(Wi) = J:= Dj - .
The Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solution concept are the same as before,
except now evaluating the outcome of a game is more numerically intensive.
The two mechanisms presented in this chapter are used to distribute resources in
supply-side markets in a competitive network setting. The first mechanism is similar
to the one found in Johari [5], and takes a multidimesional bid and sets aggregate
demand to aggregate supply at every demand source. The second mechanism is a
Kelly-like mechanism [6] which takes a single bid from each supplier and minimizes
aggregate cost while ensuring supply meets demand. No analysis is presented, but
it is an interesting future research direction as it would shed light on if these were
potential appropriate markets for power networks.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis attempts to address the problem of how to efficiently allocate resources
in a competitive enviroment. In this respect, we presented and analyzed certain
mechanisms which may model different types of engineering and economic scenarios.
The most relevant model seems to be the one for power networks: by understanding
our mechanisms we may be able to gain future insight in how to increase the efficiency
of deregulated power markets.
5.1 Research Summary
In this thesis we introduced some market mechanisms and tried to analyze their worst
case efficiency loss. To do this, we first introduced some basic game theory concepts.
We then introduced a two-sided mechanism which naturally followed from Johari's
previous work. After showing the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the mechanism,
we performed numerical simulations and constructed worst case scenarios to help us
understand the mechanism. We then presented an example where efficiency comes
arbitrarily close to zero. Next, we considered other mechanisms where suppliers
submit multidimensional bids and where the players bid sequentially. We then showed
these mechanisms have a worst case efficiency loss which approaches 100% as well. We
moved on fi-om two-sided mechanisms by constructing several supply-side mechanisms
in a network setting. We did not analyze the efficiency loss of these mechanisms, but
this is one of several areas of potential future research.
5.2 Areas for Future Research
There are several interesting paths we can take to continue to analyze efficiency loss.
The most obvious direction is to try to find some more general statements about our
two-sided market mechanism. Does there exist a parameterized family of demand
and supply functions such that a market clearing mechanism is guaranteed to have
an efficiency loss bounded away from 100%? Can we alter the two-sided market
mechanism so that an efficient outcome is guaranteed (perhaps by imposing stricter
assumptions or by increasing/decreasing the strategy space)?
As a next step, we can analyze the worst case efficiency loss of our supply-side
mechanisms. The analysis may be difficult, but solving this problem will likely lend
great insight into networked markets with fixed demand, like power markets.
As a final note, we should mention that the Nash equilibrium concept is inherently
static and tells us nothing about how players might dynamically interact. We did
not consider how players will interact to approach a Nash equilibrium or if their
behavior will even converge to a Nash equlibrium. An interesting future direction is
to model the response of market participants and see how they change their strategy
over time as price, aggregate supply, and aggregate demand change and analyze the
evolving efficiency loss. Modeling this is difficult as some players may react faster than
others and may use historical information in different ways. The models neccessary
to analyze this behavior must be quite robust and this is definitely an interesting
open direction.
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